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Introduction 
Foundations of a Theory 
of Constituency Influence 
Titis chapter contains a presentation and discussion of the components of our 
theory. We will introduce and attempt to justify a number of concepts and 
assun1ptions which in co1nbination make possible the analysis in later chapters. 
Like all theoretical worlds, the one we posit is n1ore or less unrealistic, an 
idealizalion of the e1npirical reality we hope to explain. But if we abstract 
appropriately and capture the most important features of the empirical situa­
tion, then we may expect to find that the theoretical processes present in the 
model world bear some correspondence to the behavior we observe in the 
empirical world. 
Parameters of the Voting Decision 
Most funda1nental!y, we begin with the assumption that the representative is a 
purposive actor. His votes are not siinply passive responses to role expectations, 
group meinberships, and interest group pressures. Rather, the representative 
votes with an eye toward achieving valued consequences. As Mathews and 
Stimson argue, 
... congressmen attempt to cast their votes so as to enhance the chances of 
achieving their goals. The potential payoffs to congressmen for casting 
roll-call votes in a reasonably rational way are so great and the potential risks of 
following any other course so large, that the members try, and try hard, to be 
reasonable.1 
We do not believe that the assumption of goal-directed voting is particularly 
radical, although many investigators tend to view legislative voting more in 
deterministic than in purposive terms. The ultimate justification for the 
assumption, of course, is the explanatory power of theories based on it. 
Given mass constituency unawareness of legislative issues and records, 
representatives apparently 1nake their voting decisions in an atmosphere of great 
uncertainty about the political impact of those decisions. We assume that 
representatives deal with that uncertainty by making subjective judgments about 
the consequences of their votes and about other parameters of their decision 
situations. These subjective estimates then are processed as inputs into the voting 
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decision problc1n. Thus, the re pre sentative's perceptions become the link 
between his constituents and his vote .  More exactly, Bayesian de cision theory 
provides the n1odel for our substantive the ory.2 Bayesian theory purports to 
prescribe optin1al decision making under uncertainty. Possibly, then, it is 
re levant to the voling decisions of re pre sentatives. A conceptual inte rpre tation 
of the fonnal re pre sentation of a <lecision proble1n constitutes the theore tical 
structure that we use in fonnulating a theory of constitue ncy influence . 
In Table 2-1 the 0 · syrnbolize n1utually e xclusive and colleclively e xhaustive 
"states of nature," elch of whid1 has a probability, Pj (0 � Pj � I, Z:,fj = I) of 
occurrence. The ai signify actions or strate gies. An act, ai, chosen when a state of 
nature, Oj, holds re sults in a consequence, xij (which 1nay be a se t of specific
outco1nes). Decision theory addresses the question of the optimum choice of 
acts.a 
To rende r this abstract representation e n1pirical!y useful one must provide 
substantive in le rpre tations of each of the fonnal concepts. What states of nature 
doe s the representative have in inind when he 1nakes his voting decision? What 
actions or strategies are available to hinl'! What consequences are perceived given 
the available strate gie s and the re levant states  of nature ?  What doe s one me an by 
an o'p1in1al strategy? Answers to each of these questions depend to a great degree 
on the answer to a final one: what are the representaiive'sgoa/s? 
To be gin to answe r the pre ceding questions conside r the representative's goals 
Table 2-1 
Formal Decision Problem 
Acts 
a, 
'; 
am 
S tates of Nature 
o, oi ........... on 
x,, Xi j · x, n 
xi' · · · · · · · · · · xii · · · · · · · · · · xin 
xmi xmj · · · · · · · · xmn 
aBayesian decision theory differ s fr om other decision theories in its concep tion of 
probability. For Bayesians, probability is  not an objective measure (e .g., relative frequency) 
nor a logi cal relation between propositions (e .g., necessary probability), Rather, probability 
is a personal "degree of belief," a subjective judgment about the like lihood of occurrence of 
an e vent. For an explication of the Bay esian viewpoint, one should consult Leonard Savage, 
The Foundations of Statfrtics ( New York: \Viley, 1954 ). The classi c articles on the topic of 
subjective probability are available now in Henry E .  Ky burg, Jr. and Howard E .  Smokier 
(eds.), Studies in Subjective Probability (New York: Wiley, 1964). 
--
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in a general way. Empirically goals are numerous. Ree le ction, legislative 
influence, prestige, policy, higher office, public service-all may play their part.3 
But we would argue that ree lection is the primary goal that the constituency 
controls: the district gives and the district can take away. Sometimes observe rs 
assume that re pre sentatives are not (or at least should not be) motivated by 
self-inte re st. Buchm1an and Tullock comn1ent wryly that we e xpect n1en to shift 
1 noral gears betwee n the e conomic and political arenas.4 Realistically or 
cynically as the case niay be , we be lieve that constituents' prefe re nces are 
reflected in a representative's voling (if at all) primarily through his concern for 
his e le ctoral survival. Assume that e ach repre sentative e valuates his situation by a 
subjective esti1nate, p, of his curre nt probability of ree lection.b TI1at is, if the 
legislature were to adjourn today for the campaign, p would symbolize the 
representative's subjective probability of winning the e le ction. We e laborate 
furthe r on this estin1ate shortly. 
It seems se lf.evident that the re levant states of nature involve the configura­
tion of intere sted vote rs. Who cares, and on which side of the issue? The nrnjor 
difficulty with this suggestion is provided by the survey researchers' retort that 
"almost no one cares, e ver." Thus, conceptualizing the states of nature pose s the 
most difficult problem in formulating the the ory. 
We will assume, first, that the re presentative doe s not perceive his district as a 
collection of atomized vote rs who re spond individually to his actions. Rathe r, 
we assuine that the representative perceives his district as a collection of groups 
of vote rs with the members of e ach group holding like preferences. We use the 
te nn "group" as a kind of shorthand for the opinion sectors into which the 
representative divides the district; no false personification is implied. A group 
may be a well-defined formal entity such as COPE or the Possum Hollow Rod 
and GWl Club, a de1nographic segment of the constituency such as Catholics or 
blacks, or an "issue public" such as proprayer-in-schools. But in any case , the 
repre sentative e xpects constituents to react to issue s as members of a group; i.e . ,  
in their roles as union members or hunters or blacks rathe r than individual 
constituents .C 
Second, we assume that the states of nature for the represe ntative 's decision 
are based on the judgments of groups of constituents that the issue at hand is 
relevant or irre levant to their interests. Thus, if a representative be lieve s his 
district contains two groups, G1 and G2, which might be inte rested in an issue, 
bQne should remember that probability of reelection i s  not equi valent to expected 
proportion of the vote, although the two should be re lated. It is perfectly possible f or a 
representative who e xpects 55 pe rcent of the vote t o  be more certain of reelection than one 
who e xpects 60 percent. The variance of the distribution of e xpected proportion of the vote
is larger in the second case . 
ewe will be assuming that on each vote the contending groups are mutually ex cl usive . S uch 
an assumption clearly would be ridiculous if applied t o  all votes, but we think it not 
unwarranted for single votes. On most vote s alignments will be relatively nonoverlapping; 
e .g., business-labor, ur ban-r ural , Republicans-Democr ats, black -white, Catholic-Prote,�tant. 
"'""""""""' 
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then the states of n<iture are four·. both <i1 <ln<l (J2 care about the issue;G1 cares 
but nut G2; G2 cares hut not G 1; neither(; 1 nor G2 cares. Still, isn't the last 
state the case fur <ill but the inost well-organized groups? Is the problem of 
constituent apathy still with us, but al the group rather than the individual level'? 
Our answer involves a special interpret<ition for the concept of"care." 
Even though nuinerous infonned constituents seldom pressure the representa­
tive directly, one suspects that the following question frequently crosses his 
mind: "What is the likelihood that this vote will provide a can1paign issue that 
will activate the 1nembers of G .'!"d We take the answer to this question, cj, as an 
esti1nate of the probability th't Gj cares. Thus, we conceptualize caring not as
the actual state of concern of constituents at the time of the vote, but rather as 
their receptivity when the vote is brought to their attention during a future 
catnpaign.e Thus, the somewhat elusive probability that a group, c1, c<ires about 
an issue, k, reflects the sornewhat harder probability estimate, cjk• that the 
representative's vote on issue k will provide a can1paign issue which will n1ove 
the 1ne1nbers of Gj during the next election campaign. In effect, the probability 
that a group cares is not a current 1neasure1nent. Rather, it is ajudg1nent about a 
future st<ite that exists after a representative and his opponent(s) h<ive made 
their efforts lo infonn groups of the record. 
Expressions of the preceding argument are not at all uncommon in the 
Ii terat ure. for example, Clausen writes hu1norously but insightfully, 
111y image of the constituency is that of a somnolent giant usually oblivious to 
the representative's existence. However, this giant has certain tender spots that 
1nust be protected fron1 the prodding opponent who would like to arouse the 
giant and turn its wrath on the negligent representative. To guard against this 
eventuality, the representative n1ust constantly reexamine the otherwise placid 
constituency to locate the tender spots and provide the needed protection 
against lhe pesky opponent. 5 
An<l Gregory notes that 
... it is ... arguable that it is a characteristic of the politician to see the chance 
of penalties and rewards where others see only public indifference and igno­
rance. 1' 
Clearly, argun1e11ts like these rely on Carl Friedrich's "law of anticipated 
reactions."7 If this 1nechanis111 fails, then in all likelihood, so will our theory. 
In sun1, survey tlndings about voter apathy and ignorance do not invalidate 
our analysis. One should re1ne1nber that reality is funneled through the 
dAs one of C lapp's inter viewees commented, "When you me asure pressure you measur e it in 
terms of wha t the groups do in an eleetion period" (mY emphasis}. Char les C lupp, The 
Congressman: I/is Job as lie Sees It (Washington: Brookings, 1963), p. 187. 
eAg:iin, "You musl be as s mar t in prospect us they [the voters] are in retrospect." Ibid., p. 
178. 
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representative's perceptions, a point Dexter etnphasized more than twenty years 
ago.8 Less flnportant than ivhether constituents actually care is whether the 
representative thinks they can be made to care. 
The actions open to a representative are to vote for or against a bill. 
Simultaneously the vote signals adoption of a position for and/or against groups 
of constituents who care about the issue, unless all are estimated to be totally 
indifferent. Thus, if a representative estimates that groups 1 arid 2 favor a bil! 
and groups 3 and 4 oppose it, we characterize his voting strategies as a1: vote 
with G 1 and G2; and a2: vote against G 1 and G2• In Chapter 4 we admit a third 
strategy, abstention, and analyze its effects. 
Let each representative measure the consequences of his actions in tenns of 
increments, x, and decrements z, in his subjective probability, p, of reelection. 
That is, given that a group cares, the representative estimates that voting with 
the group results in some increase (at least no loss) in support from the 
group. Thus, his subjective probability of reelection rises from p to ( p + x ), 
where x;;;::.. 0. Conversely, if the representative votes against the group, he expects 
some loss (at least no gain) in support from the group. This reduced support is 
reflected in a lower probability of reelection ( p - z ), where z;;;::.. 0. Define the 
strength, Sik' of a group, Gj, with respect to an issue, k, a<; ( xjk + zjk ). That is, 
a representative judges a group's strength on an issue according to their 
estimated total capability, ( xjk + zjk ), of changing his subjective probability of 
reelection. Henceforth, when we speak of stronger and weaker groups we use the 
term in this specific sense. Only groups for whom the representative estimates a 
nonzero strength need be considered in the decision calculus. Such groups we 
term significant. But notice that the representative detennines significance, not 
the researcher. 
[n sociological tern1s the xjk' zjk are perceived positive and negalive 
sanclions, respectively. Those who study sanctions have distinguished two 
components, a power or capability component, and an effectiveness or credibil­
ity component.9 To expand somewhat, a group has a certain sanctioning 
capability, if exercised, but also a certain likelihood of delivering. We have 
attempted to capture these components in the xjk• zjk• and c-k, respectively. 
The xjk and zjk are to be interpreted as the aggregate payoffs if �e group should 
react to a campaign issue sten1ming from the representative's vote. TI1e c-k 
represents the estimate that the vote does become an issue. We assume that the 
xjk and zjk estimates are independent of the cjk estimate. That is, the 
representative is capable of separating the power or capability component from 
the likelihood component. Empirically, decision makers sometimes tend to 
confound their evaluations of payoffs with the probabilities of attaining them.1 0 
Theoretically, though, we require greater exactitude from the political decision 
makers. 
A final comment-our analysis takes the strength estimates as given. Clearly, 
these aggregate estimates must be functions of numerous arguments. The latter 
�"'-· za:;;:;;::;;z;::� 
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would include a group's size, its control of resources such as money, media and 
workers, its properties as a reference group for other constituents, etc. Ideally, 
one would like a theory of how representatives combine such diverse elements 
into an overall strength esti1nate. That is a topic for future research. For the 
present we si1nply assu1ne that representatives somehow manage to make such 
es!i1nates.f 
All of the concepts introduced con1blne to 1nake up the schematic voting­
decision problen1. Table 2-2 illustrates the interpreted decision problem for a 
very si1nple case: the representative's district is ho1nogeneous with respect to the 
issue at hand (e.g., the J 957 Civil Rights Act in a Mississippi black belt district). 
Several additional comments now are in order. First, we require that 
x <(I  - p ) . If not, ( p + x ), the representative's subjective probability of 
reelection after a vote "w.ith" his constituents, may be greater than one. 
Similarly, z <p insures that ( p z) following an "against" vote will not be 
negative. Decision theorists have de1nonstrated that if decision makers are 
coherent, their subjective probability estimates will obey all the properlies of the 
usual probability calculus.g We impose such a consistency requirement on the 
model representatives. Second, if c = 0, the decision problem evaporates: both 
voling strategies yield equivalent results. For this reason, the analysis considers 
only nondegenerate decision problems---those for which ci > 0 for at least one 
significant Gf' Thus, we do not atte1npt to predict every representative's vote on 
every issue. If a representative estin1ates that lj = 0, Vi, on a vote, that vote is 
outside the scope of the theory. 
Table 2-2 
Interpreted Decision Proble1n 
St.. Consti tuency (i.e., Whites) P,0� 
<i6//: ,,,, c"'" - c,., 
Vote ( c) (l�c) 
With x O 
Against --z 0 
wherex<(l �p) 
z<p 
fFor a dditiona l remarks on the concep tualization of the cik' xik• and z;k, see Chapter 4. 
g"Coherence" is a technical term used by Bayesians. Essentially, if one's subjective 
judgmen ts are coherent, i t  is impossible to formulate a series of bets such that one is sure to 
lose money. That possibility exists i f  one is incoherent. A necessary and sufficient condition 
for coherence is simply that the sum of the probabili ties of n m utually exclusive and 
collectively exhaustive even ts i s  un ity. See Bruno de Finetti, "Foresight: Its Logical Laws, 
Its Subjective Sources," in Ky burg and Smokier, pp. 93-158. 
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Motivational Assumptions 
Although we have specified a representative's primary goal as reelection, as yet 
we have presented no precise criteria by which to identify an opti1nal strategy. 
In decision theory one assumes ordinarily that the decision maker is a 
maximizer. He always prefers more of a positively valued consequence to less of 
it, or less of a negatively valued consequence to more of it. If one were to 
assume that the representative's goal was to n1aximize his subjective probability 
of reelection, one would define an optin1al strategy as one which n1axin1izes his 
expected subjective probability incren1ent. Referring to Table 2·2, a representa· 
tive would choose to vote "with" on all decisions taking this fonn. 
Maximizing assumptions have a long and honorable tradition. Of course, such 
assumptions are idealizations, but they appear to be sufficiently good approxi­
mations that useful theories can be based on them. Still, legislative researchers 
know that besides reeleclion, numerous other goals-legislative influence, policy, 
prestige, party loyalty, higher office-· are quite important to many legislators. 
Can one ignore such goals? By no means, in our opinion. But, let us examine the 
question of goals 1nore closely. 
An in1portant fact to reme1nber is that there is no necessary incompatibility 
between a desire to maxin1ize electoral support and a desire to achieve other 
ends. Many legislators may find that lhe various things they desire can be 
attained by the sa1ne behavior. For example, consider a Jolm McCormack. 
certainly, there is little reason to believe that maximizing support in his Irish 
working-class district would conflict with his New Deal Policy beliefs and his 
partisan leadership position. Those representatives whose goals are mutually 
reinforcing might as well maximize electoral support, for by doing so they 
simultaneously accomplish other ends. Thus, for representatives whose goals are 
congruent, to assun1e that they aspire to electoral certainty may be an 
oversimplification, but not a serious one. 
Still, there are Frank Smiths in the world as well as John McCormacks:1 1 
That is, some representatives find their electoral goals not always consistent with 
other things they value-policies they favor, and legislative party loyalties in 
particular. Depending on the importance of these other goals relative to electoral 
support, the assumption of maximizing probability of reelection may be 
unacceptably inaccurate for such representatives. Were we willing to postulate 
utility functions defined over broadly specified packages of consequences, no 
problem would arise. A greater utility necessarily represents a more preferred set 
of outcomes than a lesser utility. But the introduction of util.ity functions 
invariably introduces severe difficulties in applying the theory. Rather than trade 
empirical applicability for theoretical generality, we have attempted to approach 
the matter of motivation another way. This alternative path utilizes ideas 
reminiscent of both lexicographic preference structures and man-as-satisficer. 
···•«-·· ---
·
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As stated previously, let us assume 1hat reelection is a representative's 
pri1n:iry goal. One need not adopt :i highly cynical view of politics to take such a 
position; rather one need only recognize that without. achieving the office, the 
benefits of office arc unattainable. [)cfoat 1neans the loss of the opportunity to 
shape public policies, the loss of the opportunity to wield power, and the loss of 
future opportunities to help one's legislative party. Thus, reelection is naturally a 
representative's priinary considerntion; everything else naturally takes second 
placc.h But certainly there is no need to postulate that reelection is the only
consideration. 
Instead, following a well-known argu1nent of Herbert Simon, let us assu1ne 
that every representative establishes an aspiration level for his probability of 
reelection.1 2 This level signifies a "satisfactory" probability of retaining office. 
Until they uUain their aspiration levels, representatives can be expected to 
follow 1naxi1nizing strategies. Additionally, representatives who set extremely 
high aspiration levels may resen1ble maxi1nizers. But some representatives may 
set their aspiration levels low enough that they bear a significant amount of 
electoral risk. Once a representative's probability of reelection equals or 
surpasses his aspiration level he nlay direct son1e attention elsewhere. He ceases 
1naxin1izing efforts and shifts to a mllintaining effort. 
To translate the preceding heuristic argument into a precise formal statement 
requires 1nore i!�s, and's, and but's than we would like. But we have little to go 
on. Nu1nerous researchers have argued about salisficing behavior in an informal 
1nanner, hut there is a paucity of atten1pts to fonnalize such arguments.13 
Assun1c that first and fore1nost, representatives atten1pt to keep p within an 
internal, Ip*, I J, 0 <p* �I, where p* denotes an aspiration level, a minimu1n 
acceptable subjective probability of reelection. So long as p < p*, a representa­
tive atten1pts to maxin1ize p: attain1nent of any goals other than an increased 
probability of reelection depends entirely on whether aclions to attain them 
coincide with pursuit of the reelection goal. When p* �p-< I, however, the 
representative ceases the n1axin1izing effort and contents himself with doing no 
worse than breaking even in his voting. Define a maintaining strategy as one 
which assigns weights ( Q, I Q ), 0 -<Q <1, to a1 and a2 in such a way as to 
result in no expected change in p. The set of[ea'llible strategies for a maintainer, 
lhen is the continuum of two-tuples between [ Q, (l - Q )] and (1, 0), or (0, I) 
and [ Q, (I · Q )] , depending upon the decision. Any mixed strategy in this 
interval is acceptable in that it leads to no expected decline in p. The 
1naintaining representative can choose whichever feasible strategy has associated 
h(n a lexicogrnphic pre ference s1r uct ure , a decision maker orders the dimensions of choice 
by their impor tance t o  him. He chooses the alternative whose expected outcome ranks 
highest on the fir st dimension, examining less important dimensions only in the event of ties 
on higher ones. The maintaining representative divides the dimensions of choice into two 
categor ie s: probabi li ty of reelection, which is primary , and all others. He sati sfice s on the 
first dimension before looking to any other . This con ce ptualization i s  par ti ally Jexico· 
graphic, but cer tainly not com ple tely so. 
--
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with it the most attractive package of secondary rewards. This latter strategy is 
his actual optimal strategy. 
Clearly, then, a nlaintaining representative theoretically has more latitude in 
voting than a nlaximizing representative. The latter simply chooses the strategy 
with the highest expected reelection value. If all other goals conflict with this 
strategy, he foregoes them. The maintaining representative typically has a 
continuum of strategies from which to choose. He is restricted by a Q level 
which usually will be less than one. If all other goals conflict with the electoral 
goal, he still has a chance (1 - Q) of attaining them. If all other goals are 
consonant with the electoral goal, he sin1ply chooses the maximizing strategy. 
And, of course, everything in between is available to him. Notice that theoretical 
results about maximizing strategies translate into exact behavioral hypotheses. 
But theoretical results about maintaining strategies usually translate only into 
behavioral hypotheses which establish a bound on behavior. The maintaining 
strategy is not an exact prediction; it only sets a floor under a representative's 
voting; i.e., a representative 1nust vote for a bill with probability at least Q. The 
assumption of maintaining behavior refers to the representative's desire at least 
to 1naintain a current position, not to a prediction that he votes so as to 
nlaintain p precisely unchanged. The latter prediction certainly would be wrong 
when other goals do not conflict with the electoral goal. 
Two further points 1nerit altention. First, because maintaining strategies 
typically are n1ixed, the opti1nal strategies eventually settled on by maintainers 
also n1ay be n1ixed, particularly in cases of conflict among goals. While these 
1nixed strategies yield no expected decline in p, on a single vote a representative 
might slip below his aspiration level. We will assume that such short-term 
stochastic falls in p below the level, p* do not change the character of the 
representative from maintainer to maximizer. Over time, the laws of 111athemati­
cal expectation wilt take care of the situation. 
On the other hand, a nlore serious question may arise. Suppose a representa­
tive consistently chooses strategies which earn more constituency credit than the 
basic maintaining strategies. Eventually he then reaches a state where pis clearly 
higher than p*. At such time the maintaining strategies calculated on the basis of 
no expected decline in p become too restrictive. For, seemingly the representa­
tive can afford to lose some probability of reelection. What does one predict 
about such a case? Here again we will follow Simon's discussion. Simon suggests 
that if decision makers find decisions "easy" in the sense that many alternatives 
produce outcomes all of which exceed the decision maker's aspiration level, a 
natural reaction of the decision maker is to up the level.14 In this manner the 
range of originally satisfactory alternatives narrows to a subset of superior ones. 
Particularly in view of the assumed partially lexicographic preference structure 
of the representative, we believe such an assumption is appropriate here. If a 
representative's voting causes p to rise significantly above p*, this would indicate 
that there is more consonance in the representative's goals than the original 
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choice of p* presun1cd. Jn effect, the original choice of p* involves more 
electoral risk than the representative need bear. Thus, he can afford to raise p*. 
We n1ight expect p* to "track" p, eventually reaching a kind of equilibriu1n level 
which denotes the greatest electoral security consistent with achieving conflict­
ing secondary goals. Over tin1e, optirnal strategics converge to 1naintaining 
strategies a:; p* varies. 
Empirically, having the representative raise his aspiration level rather than 
drop his prohability of reelection back to the old level appears reasonable to us. 
Opponents in the district 1nay be encouraged by any sign that the representa­
tive's elcctornl position is deteriorating, regardless of his absolute position. 
Knowing this, a n1aintaining representative rnay not consciously strive to exceed 
his aspimlion level, but once beyond it, he believes it i1nprudent to slip back. 
To surn up the n1otivational discussion, the analysis to follow examines and 
co1npares the behavior of two types of representative. The first is the maximizer. 
A new representative n1ight be working his way up to an initial aspiration level. 
A representative 1night have erred seriously on a vote, causing p lo turnble far 
below p*. A redistricting which rernoves old supporters or adds new opponents 
inight affect p si1nilarly. Those who desire subjective certainty (p*= 1) can 
attain and 1naint<iin it only by beh<iving as 1naxitnizers, if then. And finally, 
those representatives who find <i happy congruence ainong their goals can afford 
to 1naxi1nize: their high aspiration level does not in terfcre with the attainment of 
secondary goals. For want of a better lern1 we call the second type of 
representative the n1aintainer. He satisfies the condition p* <,.p ,,;;;1. Having 
attained or exceeded bis aspiration level he is content n1erely to avoid losing 
support. Any further gain is accidental. Thus, we have posited two ideal types of 
representative. Adn1ittedly, both are approxi1nations, as theoretical constructs 
always are. llopefully lwo approxi1nations will allow a 1nore con1prehensive 
analysis thm1 one. 
111e Ungrateful Electorate 
Only one task now ren1ains before proceeding with the analysis. Optimal 
decision inaking involves a weighing of gains and losses. But thus far we have 
spoken of the costs and benefits !o the hypothetical representative only in the 
1nost general terms. Indeed, all we have said is that a vote in accord with a group 
of constituents, c1, n1erits an incren1ent, xj, while a vote against them incurs a 
decren1ent, zi" We have specified no relationship between xj and xk, or zj and zk. 
Nor h:.ive we specified any reh1fionship between xi and z .. The first set of 
relationships requires no special assumption. Without loss of generality, in each 
decision problen1 we will list the groups in order of their estin1ated strength. 
Thus, for a two-group decision, ( x 1 k + z 1 k ) > ( x2 k + z2 k ). In general, 
S1k�S2k�· · · �snk· 
.., 
.,..... 
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As for the relationship between xjk and zjk• we do impose an a priori 
restriction. Specifically, we assun1e that zjk �xik' Vi,Vk. That is, given that a 
group cares about an issue, we assume that the representative believes that a vote 
in accord with the interest of the group gains him relatively less credit than a 
vote against their interest loses. This assumption expresses a rather co1nmon bit 
of political folklore. V.O. Key, Jr., once observed that perhaps voters vote 
"against," not "for."1 5 Political scientists all will remember Alben Barkley's 
classic, "Whal have you done for me lately?" anecdote.16 And in a splendid 
example of lhe sentin1ent we atten1pt to capture, a Tennessee voter observes 
I think tnost people in Tennessee would like to vote Democratic because they 
make more money under the Democrats. But it's the people who're running as 
Democn1ts this time that make the difference. Voters aren't for Brock, they're 
against Gore. And a man will stand in line at the polis a lot longer to vote again.I'! 
snn1ebody than he will to vote for somebody. (Our emphasis)1 7 
AdmHtedly, the assuinption that z 'k ;;:;. x ·k· 'rJ i''r;f k will violate reality on 
occasion. For example, if a representa/ive be1ieves p = O prior to a given vote, 
consistency requires that he esti1nate zi = 0, Vi on that vote. Yet in this situation 
seemingly xj could be positive for some Gj" Another example, if a representative 
estiniates that l 00 percent of a group oppose hin1, he might reasonably believe 
that they can't hurt him any n1ore, but that they could help. But although the 
assumption may be e1npirical!y wrong at times, the violations probably occur in 
extreme situations like the above. Most of empirical reality lies between the 
extremes, so we trust the assu1nption will lead to no serious error, and it inay 
capture an important aspect of the representative's environment. 
While the ordering of groups from those with greatest perceived electoral 
strength to those with least, and the assu1nption that zi >-xi, the theoretical 
structure now contains enough detail to permit the deduction of various 
behavioral propositions. A compact summary of the substantive concepts and 
assumptions introduced and discussed in this chapter precedes the analysis. 
Summary 
Let p 
p* 
Gj 
cjk 
xik 
the representative's subjective estimate of his current prob­
ability of reelection. 
the representative's minimum "acceptable" subjective prob­
ability of reelection. 
a significant group whom a representative estimates to be 
potentially concerned about an issue. 
the representative's subjective estimate that his vote on 
issue k will draw Gj into the next election campaign. 
the expected increment in p resulting from voting as the 
members ofGj prefer on issue 
k. 
--------------------------!!l��.:.=-'�'·"'-"'""'�·'·
·
''C:..O. 
z jk 
sik 
a, 
a, 
Maxirnizcr 
Maintainer 
IQ,O - Q)J 
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the expected decrement in p resulting from not voting as 
the me1nbers of Gj prefer on issue k. 
the "strength" of G · on issue k: Sjk = ( xjk + zjk ). 
a vote with a set of groups who take a position on an issue. 
u vote against the set of groups who prefer a1 -by in1plica­
tiun, a vote wilh a set of groups who hold an opposing 
preference. 
a representative who votes with the sole intention of 
1naxi1nizing p. 
a representative content to "break even" on each vote. 
a niaintaining strategy. 
A.�surnptions About Parameters of 
Lhe Voting Decision 
I. The states of nature are all the possible co1nbi11ations in which n groups may 
"care" or not care; 
2. The probabilities of the stales of n<1ture are calculated by combining the
csti1nated ()k's, where the latter are assu1ned to be independently distributed: 
3. The payorts are the estinrnted xjk's <1nd zjk's, where these are assumed to be 
independent of the cjk's.
4. zjk�xik' Vi, Vk, where these nun1bers are constrained so as to satisfy the usual probability assu1nptions.
Motivational Assun1plio11 
A representative votes so as to raise his subjective probability of reelection, p, to 
a level,p*,(O<.p*� I). 
I. Until p reaches the level p* a representative votes so as to maxin1ize p. 
2. Ifµ con1es to exceed p*, a representative raises p*.
One final ren1ark: we have constructed an alinosl completely subjective 
n1odcl. Thus, the p, c1, cj, and Sj need not correspond to the judgments or
rneasure1nents of outside observers. We believe that the explanation for a 
representative's voting behavior lies in his perceptions, not in ours. We inay 
console ourselves with the supposition that those representatives who grossly 
1nisjudge the en1pirical situation probably do not survive long in the electoral 
arena.i But while lhey do, their judgn1ents, however distorted, explain their
voting. 
iSome e vidence for this supposi tion appears in an article on Iowa legislators' perceptions of 
their constituents' op inions. The legislator s were asked to judge whether e ach of four 
proposed constitutional amendments would receive majority back ing in their districts in an 
upcoming referendum. Of those representatives with two or more incorrect p redictions, 1 1  
.,.... 
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